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Introduction 
Waiter, there’s a fly in my soup!  
Shh! Not so loud! Everyone else will want one too!  
Globalization as we know it now emerged after World War II. Proliferation as we know it now also 
emerged after World War II—not only with the advent of nuclear weapons, but with the advent of 
long-range ballistic missiles, starting with the German V-2.  
Globalization is the interconnectedness of the world, especially through trade, but in new and 
intricate ways that constitute a qualitative change and on a scale that far outstrips previous 
episodes of globalization. It has spread gradually since the end of World War II, although with 
intermittent setbacks, adding more and more countries, some with stronger links to the rest of the 
world than others. The number of countries and the proportion of world population not yet joining 
globalization have been shrinking, though some may never be able to join and may forever dwell 
in nasty, brutish, and poor conditions. Globalization is an ongoing phenomenon, with neither 
inevitable character nor outcome. One can imagine it all breaking apart again, but it is hard to 
make the case for breakdowns—it takes a lot more imagination than describing its twists and 
turns. Do we think of globalization as growing exponentially? Not really, because it is not 
automatic, especially now that membership in the Word Trade Organization (WTO) is becoming 
the qualification for having been “globalized.” That takes negotiation.  
Proliferation is the increasing number of countries acquiring weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)—nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. This 
article is confined to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Is proliferation exponential? Not likely. The 
data set is still too small and the course of events too slow, whereas the data set for globalization 
as a broader process is far richer.  
Are globalization and proliferation in some kind of symbiotic relationship, growing with, and as a 
result of, each other? Is the process of globalization, as it makes technology, education, and 
other aspects of modern life, available to more and more countries—and even individuals or 
private organizations—stimulating proliferation? Is proliferation in some kind of race with 
globalization to make it all break down somehow? No. The next steps in proliferation are being 
taken by North Korea, Iran, and the least globalized countries in the world.[1] Proliferation is so 
incidental that it is hard to connect it to globalization in general. It has been only a very small part 
of the unfolding of the world system as we have witnessed it. Any use of WMD would be 
catastrophic, of course, but across the long history of proliferation, it hasn’t happened yet—except 
for the first and only use of nuclear weapons by the United States in 1945.[2] It is probably a good 
thing the United States did that; the awesome effects have probably deterred further use more 
than anything else.[3]  
The history of the post-World War II world—especially since the break-up of the Soviet Union—
has been marked by the steady decline of state-on-state conflict, the steady and steep decline of 
internal conflicts, the shrinking number and isolation of the very few rogue states, and the growing 
number of democratic countries. Democracy, however, is a fragile thing and is threatened now 
even in the United States. These aspects are coupled with the growth of economies (that is, 
prosperity). Concomitantly, we are seeing a worldwide decline in defense budgets and a growth 
in governments funding social safety nets—a phenomenon that is generally alarming and 
incomprehensible to the American security community. This is the broad arrow of globalization’s 
direction.  
The case of China might possibly pose some exceptions to all of this. That is, we don’t quite know, 
nor does China know, how it will eventually fit into the flow of globalization. It’s off to a good start, 
though its threats to Taiwan and its military programs aimed toward that country are threats to 
world peace. But the China case is not particularly relevant in trying to sort out the possible 
coupling between globalization and proliferation—except as it applies to its support to Pakistan, 
providing warhead designs and missiles when China was in the rogue role (which we hope it no 
longer is).  
And then there are the new global terrorists, who have taken advantage of the ease of personal 
movement, global communications, and movement of money around the world to strike in various 
places—from Bali to New York. They are coupled with the most difficult current problem of 
globalization: whether The Gap countries—that is, the Islamic countries, and particularly the Arab 
countries of the Middle East—can fully enter the global system.[4] Right now, they are struggling 
with their existing awkward connections with the aspects of globalization and with the globalized 
world, while falling behind in many respects.  
So there are connections between globalization and proliferation, but mostly because they’ve 
been happening in one world system. One process is very broad, rich, exuberant, and 
sweeping—finally bringing huge masses of people into better living—while the other is small, 
sneaky, narrow, and happening to countries that are, or have been, at various stages of the post-
World War II process, outcasts in the great world system. Has globalization reached the stage 
where any technology is available to any country, group, or individual? And would this mean 
exponential proliferation? Probably not. It’s harder than one thinks. It is also true that globalization 
is not some automatic, self-regulating, self-generating process, but something that must be 
managed. And, managing proliferation is part of that. 
The Emergence and Evolution of Globalization 
Let us look at globalization first. As previously stated, it started back in 1945, with the restoration 
of West Germany and Japan to the civilized world and the recovery of Europe, first simply as 
humanitarian relief and then with economic rebuilding stimulated by the Marshall Plan. The 
surprise was that West Germany and Japan quickly emerged as major exporters, and they still 
play a huge role in global trade. (Germany just edged ahead of the United States to reclaim its 
role as the world’s largest exporter—something we forget as Chinese exports grow. China has a 
long way to go to catch up.)[5]  
The World War II allies met at Bretton Woods in 1945 to establish a set of international rules that 
would help avoid another Great Depression—which many thought was a prime stimulant for 
World War II. The states trying to overcome the Depression undertook, as Harold James has 
analyzed, high tariffs, restrictions on immigration, and currencies fixed to the gold standard—all 
autarkic and beggar-thy-neighbor policies.[6] They also stimulated their economies with heavy 
industry—building ships, tanks, and airplanes. More importantly, Bretton Woods set up the new 
rules and institutions that provided financial stability and resolution for the problems of the 
participating countries.  
The Cold War 
But this new globalization system that the United States led in the aftermath of World War II took 
on a new dimension with the emergence of the Cold War only about two years into the new era. 
The Soviets offered a competing system, both in economics and in politics. And talk about 
proliferation! The wild nuclear arms race took off in the 1950s with consequences—not all of them 
bad, as will be discussed later. The Cold War was also an extension of the two European world 
wars. The West as a concept was one of new Trans-Atlantic relations and trade with the addition 
of Japan, (and later South Korea.) This was in contrast to the old notion of Occident and Orient, 
with the Orient beginning at Istanbul. We still cling to the notion of the West, but, really, 
globalization wipes it out. Nonetheless, the West, in contrast to the Soviet East, formed the core 
of globalization as it emerged. Its rules and the amicability of the relations of its component 
countries constituted the core of the world system and became truly global with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union’s putative competing system.  
Decolonization 
Decolonization was another outgrowth of the Western system. It was a mixed blessing for the 
unfolding concept of globalization. Decolonization happened because the old metropoles—after 
their devastation in World War II—found that their colonies now needed subsidies rather than 
continuing to be the cash cows they had been prior to the war. In a sense, decolonization was a 
retreat from globalization, but the former metropoles did leave systems of government in place, at 
least in most of the new states. Unfortunately, that system was one of state planning, which some 
call socialism, rather than a complete free market. The Soviet East and the West competed to 
install their systems in these new states, but eventually corruption in many of them overcame 
governing systems and economics and, as a result, even now, many states are left unconnected 
to the new global economic system. The end of the Cold War marked the end of state planning of 
economies—and this was bad news for support of military establishments, to be discussed later.  
The Rise of the Far East 
Germany and Japan exuberantly increased exports and got rich, with the rest of Europe following 
by at least 1980. The next step in globalization was the emergence in the 1970s and into the 
1980s of the Asian Tigers—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, followed by 
Malaysia, Thailand, and, almost, Indonesia. What they represented was the diffusion of 
manufacturing and financing, as represented by Nike shoes. They were dependent on the 
emerging world economic system and helped create it at the same time. Maybe this was what 
Deng Xiaoping saw as he set out to cure China’s economic doldrums by opening up to the world, 
though the real Chinese take-off in its contributions to the global economy seems to have begun 
around the mid-1990s. 
The Exclusion of the Middle East 
Two sides of the earth—the Euro-American combination and the Far East—were creating the 
new wealth and new trade, from sneakers to computer chips. Something was missing in the 
middle—the Middle East and South Asia, and especially the Islamic world, stretching from 
Morocco to Pakistan. It was part of globalization because of all the oil there. Oil had been a global 
commodity from at least the 1930s because its main sources were not its main users. The United 
States as a government didn’t get too excited about the global oil market until around 1970, at 
which time its recognition grew that the United States’ own oil would run out (the United States is 
still the third largest pumper of oil in the world). Yet U.S. oil companies, along with British and 
Dutch competitors, had been global since the 1930s. They already knew what globalization was 
and had created large fleets of super-tankers. But the U.S. government itself got into the Middle 
East only by fits and starts, torn by its conflict of motives between supporting Israel and ensuring 
the continued flow of oil.  
Let no one say that globalization was anything planned—it has unfolded by inadvertence all the 
way. Yet let us not forget that it was American businessmen who had been busy creating it, from 
oil originally, through their exploitation of the new opportunities of the European Common Market, 
and even later in the relentless search for cheap products from China. It was American buyers 
that opened up opportunities in China, not Chinese salesmen in the United States.  
When the author entered Middle Eastern affairs in 1979, he did not think about globalization or 
worry about its connections to the countries there. Rather, most felt the United States was in 
some kind of competition with the Soviets, especially after the Shah of Iran fell and the Soviets 
invaded Afghanistan. The West got Egypt; the Soviets got Ethiopia, which meant the West was 
coming out ahead. With the end of the 1973 war, Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, and the Camp David 
Accords, many observers thought Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East were ending. They were 
surprised by the emergence of the monster Saddam and his going to war against Iran in 1980 
and against Kuwait in 1990. This may have been the greatest lost opportunity to connect the 
Middle East to globalization, for Iraq had the potential to participate fully in the global economy, in 
contrast to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But now because of Saddam’s wars, the wild growth of Arab 
countries’ populations, and the spread elsewhere of the benefits of globalization’s world trade, we 
find the Middle East falling way behind. Iran’s decision to become a theocratic regime and largely 
withdraw from the world, other than its oil, didn’t help.  
The quagmire the United States is now in, in Iraq, and the spread of the gossamer web of global 
Islamic terrorism have further complicated the picture of spreading globalization. It is ironic that 
the United States invaded Iraq to stem proliferation that turned out not to exist, whatever lust for it 
may have remained in Saddam’s heart, while the fear of the global terrorists acquiring WMD 
remains. The United States still has big problems in the Middle East, but these are problems 
more associated with dragging them into the globalized world and less as matters of proliferation. 
The Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The final chapter in creating the new globalization, though not in how it may evolve, lay in the 
collapse of the competing Soviet system. While the U.S. government provided much of the 
world’s security, U.S. businessmen, along with their West German and Japanese counterparts, 
had set up the global economic system that lay outside the Soviet bloc.[7] The U.S. government 
trailed along on the economic side, promoting free trade rules through the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and organizing the G-7 (G-8 with the addition of Russia).[8] It was too easy to 
simply call that global system outside the Soviet bloc containment. Life outside the Soviet Bloc 
was bigger than that. Defense did containment. Everybody else was globalizing. What the 
collapse meant was that a lot more countries wanted to join globalization, not least Russia and 
the Caspian countries wanting to pump and export more oil and gas. It also meant, though, that 
the Central Asian and Caucasian countries were close to becoming failed or dictatorial states 
(though it is interesting that we hear nothing from Tajikistan these days, the one place aside from 
Chechnya where there was a real civil war).  
Results of Globalization 
And so globalization really took off in the 1990s and into the first years of the 21st century. It even 
survived the financial crisis in East Asia in 1997 and the collapse of the information technology 
boom in the United States in 2001.[9] India started to free itself from state planning beginning in 
1991, and the Chinese economy really took off from the mid-1990s.  
What kind of world has globalization brought us?  
• The Cold War has ended.  
• State-on-state conflicts have essentially disappeared, except for those the United States 
has gotten involved in and others it may yet pursue.  
• There has also been a steep decline in internal conflicts, however intense some may be 
and whatever the continuing mess in Congo.  
• Defense budgets in all the advanced countries except the United States (which, for a 
short time, took a peace dividend) have declined, many steeply.  
One big reason for the decline in conflicts and military confrontations is that governments are 
maintaining safety nets for the population—a very un-American idea, but the Bush administration 
is working hard to put that right in our own country—and this puts a squeeze on defense budgets. 
Another reason is that the Mid-East countries lost access to all that free equipment from the 
Soviet Union. The equipment they acquired before the collapse of the Soviet Union is getting very 
old, and is without replacement. Where China’s defense budget will go is a mystery right now, in 
part because they have just started and in part because they also have to create a social safety 
net as they close down the old Soviet-style, state-owned enterprises in favor of private enterprise. 
Their military equipment is built in state-owned enterprises, when not purchased from Russia.  
Global Terrorism 
The new element threatening global peace is global terrorism, which the United States 
recognized fully on 9/11, but which had been brewing for some time following the United States’ 
encouragement of Arabs to go fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets.  
The spread of this threat has been facilitated by globalization—notably, by the ease of air travel, 
the mobility of people, and the advent of cell phones and the Internet. It also comes from restless 
Arabs and other Muslims from repressive countries, who emigrated only to find themselves in 
anomic situations in their new countries—especially in Europe—where they are encouraged by 
Saudi-financed preachers to attack the West and Western cultures. Additionally, U.S. forces are 
bogged down in Iraq, a dramatic change that has diverted the United States from otherwise 
fostering globalization as it had before.  
Global terrorists form a gossamer web around the globe except in China (excluding the eight 
million beleaguered Uighurs in Sinkiang). They lost their base with the loss of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. They are dispersed in small cells. They haven’t attacked the United States now for 
nearly five years, though all of us are ready for anything. Most of the world goes about its 
business and tries to take care of its mostly economic problems without thinking much about the 
terrorists. Two new books on globalization don’t mention, or barely mention, terrorism.[10] Neither 
one has a reference to proliferation in its index. There is much talk among the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and DOD about “failed states” and by DOD about “ungoverned areas,” but 
so far none have proved hospitable as a new al Qaeda base. 
Globalization and Proliferation 
Let us now turn from the expansion of globalization over the last 60 years, and the vast activity in 
the world that comes under that heading, to the specific cases of proliferation across the same 
period. The cases are limited, but the expectation across all 60 years has been that at any 
moment it will grow exponentially. We are now in a new phase of that fear, one that anticipates 
that it is the global terrorists who want to acquire nuclear weapons.  
The nuclear bomb era began in 1945. The chemical weapons era emerged earlier, in World War I. 
The biological weapons era has not been quite realized, though both the Soviet Union and the 
United States worked hard at it, and there are rumors that the Russians continue the Soviet work. 
The focus here is the nuclear weapons issue. Long-range ballistic missiles also appeared at the 
end of World War II, with the advent of the German V-2 and the dispersal of German technicians 
to both the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Without going into the vast nuclear and missile race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, note that their huge numbers had a damping effect and made all other efforts look pathetic. 
Proliferation for both the United States and the Soviet Union meant others building nuclear 
weapons. The United States reluctantly let the United Kingdom into the club, given its cooperation 
in the Manhattan Project, and later, much more reluctantly, France. A scheme called the 
Multilateral Force planned to keep Germany from getting nuclear weapons. Apparently, all the 
Germans really wanted was to be involved in the planning for the use of nuclear weapons in 
Europe.[11]  
The Soviets, for their part, set the Chinese up in the business. The Chinese first tested a nuclear 
weapon in 1964. It is remarkable how slowly Chinese nuclear forces have grown.[12]  
France and the United Kingdom have, in the interim, shrunk their nuclear forces down to a few 
air-delivered bombs and their submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).[13]  
By the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, there were great fears that South Korea and Taiwan would 
go nuclear. The Swedes and the Japanese have had the capabilities to do so, but still haven’t.  
Later, the Brazilians and Argentineans confronted each other. The Argentines were even 
developing a missile, the Condor, and might have been sharing it with the Egyptians. But Brazil 
and Argentina gave it up, although the Brazilians still seem intent on enriching uranium.[14]  
Then came the Israelis, in the late 1960s. Some of those working Mid-East affairs in the 
Intelligence Community at the time wanted to deny Israel F-4 aircraft unless they stopped their 
nuclear program. But, Lyndon Johnson specifically called them off.  
After China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, India, too, resolved to develop nuclear 
weapons. They tested something they called a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974. It was 
so peaceful that they didn’t even instrument it, so they didn’t know the yield. Pakistan followed 
suit with its own indigenous program. By the time the United States entered into relations with 
them in early 1980—after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—it was clear that A. Q. Khan was up 
to something and that they were well down the road.[15] In 1989, the U.S. government could no 
longer certify that Pakistan was not weaponizing, and U.S. assistance programs were cut off. 
Finally, in 1998, with the advent of the Bhartiya Janta Party-led Hindu nationalist government, 
India tested weapons, and Pakistan followed shortly thereafter.  
It’s well known that the Israeli and Indian reactors, Dimona and Tarapur, used to provide 
plutonium for their weapons, were provided by Canada. Canada also built a reactor outside 
Karachi, and there was a hole in it that evoked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
suspicion. But, Pakistan’s fissile material production seems to have been outside Islamabad, with 
centrifuges and their designs stolen by A. Q. Khan from the uranium enrichment company, 
URENCO, in the Netherlands.  
Somewhere in this general time frame, South Africa developed its own nuclear weapons—six 
gun-type bombs. As a political scientist from South Africa has explained, the Afrikaner 
government feared black hordes descending upon them from the north. These scenarios got 
even more fantastic once they had possession of nuclear weapons. But, then South Africa had its 
revolution, and a multi-color government took over. The blacks were in charge, as it were, and the 
Afrikaners decided that they had better dismantle the nuclear weapons. It’s unclear what they did 
with the highly enriched uranium in that program.  
A. Q. Khan turns out to have been privately selling technology and centrifuges to Iran and to 
Libya, and had possibly been dealing with North Korea as well. Libya apparently never got their 
equipment and materials out of crates; some of their shipments were intercepted; and they 
decided to give it up in order to rejoin the globalized world.  
And now the United States is struggling with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs—the 
next chapter in proliferation of nuclear weapons. Iran started its program in the late 1980s, but it 
is some time away from having enough fissile material to make a weapon. The first crisis with 
North Korea came in 1994 when rods were transferred to a cooling pond at Yongbyon.  
Who is next? The terrorists would love to have and use nuclear weapons, as well as chemical 
and biological. They would have to steal or buy them since there is no evident place in which they 
could set up an industrial capability to produce them on their own—their efforts in Afghanistan 
were exceedingly primitive. The place to steal one would be Russia, where there is continuing 
confusion as to whether fissile material removed from dismantled weapons is fully secure. An 
intact weapon might well be too heavy. The availability of suitcase bombs seems to have been 
strongly discounted.[16] North Korea might be willing to sell them one for big money. Would Iran 
give terrorists a weapon? It’s unlikely. They are Shia; the terrorists are Sunnis. The Iranians could 
give a bomb to the Lebanese Hezbollah, who are Shia, to use against Israel, but this would be 
suicidal for Iran.  
If North Korea is to be a nuclear possessor, and otherwise seems not under restraint, 
containment, or deterrence, South Korea and Japan might be tempted to follow.[17] This should 
be the greatest incentive for China to try to stop North Korea, but it is not clear it can. It is ironic 
that the notion of North Korea threatening China itself seems completely absurd. China is simply 
not threatened, which says something about the politics of all this.  
Who else? James Russell speculates that the Saudis might be in the market. To deter who? The 
Iranians? Possibly.  
Then there are the ballistic missiles for WMD warheads to go on. They are mostly variants of 
Scuds and Nodongs from North Korea. Russia sold a lot of Scuds. They have been in the Middle 
East for decades. Scuds are just variants of V-2s. It is absurd to think that any country would 
strap a bunch of these Scuds together to make an ICBM, especially without testing. And, as 
retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin—whose career was in testing missiles—notes, half of the 
first 10 tests of any new missile fail. He has also observed that the United States and Soviet 
Union tested a new missile up to 70 times to establish reliability and accuracy. We see nothing of 
the sort in North Korea or Iran. Pakistan and India, however, are proceeding with their missile 
programs.  
To summarize, in contrast to the enormous activity characterizing the process of globalization 
over the last 60 years, we have instead this slim chain of proliferation events: the United 
Kingdom-France-China-Israel-South Africa-India-Pakistan-and now North Korea and Iran. We 
must treat Iran’s eventual nuclear capability as inevitable until we definitely know otherwise; but 
somehow it is hard to believe they are going the route that Japan has taken—to the brink of the 
accumulation of fissile material, but not weaponizing. All of this has taken place despite the 
spread of nuclear power reactors in selected countries around the world—most decades ago. We 
have seen a few countries forego the opportunity to pursue nuclear weapons. South Africa gave 
up its weapons. Brazil and Argentina receded, though Brazil still raises suspicions. Libya gave up 
its unopened crates. The United Kingdom, France, and China, along with the United States, and 
now Russia as successor to the Soviet Union, are the P-5 (Permanent Members of the UN 
Security Council) and are recognized in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as legitimate. 
Connecting Globalization to Proliferation 
How, then, does this slim proliferation record compare with globalization? Might globalization be 
somehow responsible?  
In the first place, it should be noted that the huge race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union made everybody else’s efforts look pathetic. The United Kingdom and France always felt 
bad, and never quite knew how their small forces fit with those of the United States.[18]  
We saw one chain of proliferation, which had something to do with the Cold War, but not with 
globalization because it came before that realization. China, India, and Pakistan all had outside 
help to build reactors.  
There has been another chain: Israel—Iraq—Iran. It is no coincidence that the only really serious 
series of wars in the Cold War—that is, India-Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971) and Arab-Israeli (1948, 
1956, 1967, 1973)—led to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by three of those countries, and 
attempts by two others.  
Pariah countries—Israel, South Africa, North Korea, Libya—pursued nuclear weapons. And yet 
the Chinese, Israeli, North Korean, Iraqi, and Iranian cases emerged from nuclear energy 
programs provided by the Soviet Union, Canada, France, and even Germany.  
Certainly one observation is that all these countries were on the margin or on the outside of 
globalization. In the Cold War context, they were among the contained; globalization spread 
under the protection of containment. They were also isolated from the main stream during 
globalization as it emerged after the Cold War.  
The aspiration of the terrorists for nuclear weapons stems from their inability to cope with 
globalization. Globalization threatens elite controls, liberates women, is relentlessly secular, and 
is economically disruptive—bringing all kinds of uncertainties, as well as opportunities, to 
everyday life.[19] Nonetheless, the terrorists’ aspirations—however catastrophic they might be—
are highly unlikely to be realized. They have dispersed, are in hiding, and can hardly assemble an 
industrial capability. Nearly five years after 9/11 and after the United States and Northern Alliance 
crushed the Taliban, they do not have a new host country.  
However, the paradox remains that it was globalization across the long term, from 1945 forward, 
that permitted any of this proliferation. The only purely indigenous efforts to build nuclear 
weapons, without other countries’ assistance, were those of the United States and Soviet Union. 
Maybe France, and possibly Israel, should be added. The United Kingdom participated at Los 
Alamos. Israel got its reactor from another country. Some might say the Soviet Union stole from 
the Manhattan project via Klaus Fuchs. Perhaps Atoms for Peace as a global initiative 
complicated the situation, Iran being the latest case. But let us remember that Atoms for Peace 
has largely worked. While there is an abundance of nuclear power stations, there hasn’t been 
much proliferation, and no weapons have been used since Nagasaki.  
Why is there so little proliferation despite the huge spread of the global economy?  
One major reason is that with the great military and nuclear weapons stand-off between the 
United States and Soviet Union, the possibility of state-on-state wars has faded across the post-
World War II period, and has dropped even more steeply since the end of the Cold War.  
Another reason is that building nuclear weapons is hard. It’s certainly not as easy as some say—
all you do is get a few kilos of plutonium or HEU, you just wrap some explosive lenses around it, 
and, presto, you have a weapon. As George Perkovich has noted, the last 5 percent of the effort 
is extremely difficult, but it would appear the first 95 percent is not so easy either.  
There is still a taboo on testing, especially in the atmosphere.[20] The Indians and Pakistanis 
broke this taboo, in 1998. The next test will cause a global uproar, though what effect that would 
have is not clear. There are people in the current U.S. administration itching to test again, and if 
the United States did, the Russians would soon follow. Those same people, though, won’t notice 
a test since they have denied that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) system of 
monitoring would ever detect anything.  
Weaponizing and mating warheads is also very hard. It takes arming and fusing, acceleration 
resistance, heat shields, etc. Half the missiles fail, too.[21] And then there is the matter of 
accuracy. At even Nodong ranges, we’re talking circle error probables of five miles.  
In any case, it takes countries with industrial capabilities, and at least some funds, to do all of this. 
This means North Korea and Iran right now. Who next? Some will say, “They will not try ballistic 
missiles, but will use cruise missiles, taking out conventional warheads and replacing them with 
nuclear.” But a knowledgeable Russian told me that Soviet AS-15 long-range nuclear cruise 
missiles left behind in Ukraine were useless, at least to Ukraine, “because they have no 
mapping.” Watching all the Center for Naval Analyses work on all the Tomahawks the U.S. Navy 
has fired, it would not appear to be easy for a cruise missile to get anywhere and to hit a target. In 
any case, the countries we are talking about are not going to have many warheads. If you use 
one or test one, you have one less.  
Finally, deterrence still works. Why not? After all, that’s what North Korea and Iran think. They 
both speak of it. The North Koreans have explicitly said that they need nukes to compensate for 
their progressively deteriorating conventional forces.[22] Why would deterrence work for them, 
and not for us? They have a few weapons, and the United States has at least 3,000 ready 
warheads, of far greater reliability and destructiveness. We would evaporate them. They know 
that. Mao might say that he would still have 300 million peasants left after a nuclear attack. North 
Korea and Iran do not have such an advantage, if it is an advantage. One can talk about an 
Iranian “preemptive” attack on Israel, or their nuking an approaching U.S. amphibious force (as if 
that could conquer Iran), but that’s nitpicking. Nuclear weapons are really good only against cities. 
Finally, the negation, in this country, of discussion and debate over deterrence arises from those 
who thought missile defense was the answer to everything. With missile defense, we would rule 
the world. Note, however, that it has not helped much in Iraq. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, does globalization make the world go to hell because of rampant proliferation of 
technology falling into the hands of rogues and terrorists? The scenarios for the evolution of 
globalization are too complex to go into here. But, remember that globalization spreads because 
it opens up economic opportunities for populations. The rogues and terrorists we are concerned 
with eschew those opportunities. These include countries that can’t run their own economies; and 
they are supposed to be brilliant exploiters of military technology? It is, to paraphrase Oscar 
Wilde, the pursuit of the unusable by the unspeakable.  
In the narrow circles that consider this question in the United States, we are entering a new 
phase of hand wringing about the inevitable 25-65 countries that will now decide possession of 
nuclear weapons is the key to their futures. It is ironic that the Cassandras of the past—notably 
represented in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—are, in this phase, the most skeptical about 
this coming proliferation. What is going on here?  
For the United States, missile defense is not the answer—this may be a straw man at this point 
anyway. The Bush administration is pursuing diplomacy now. What lies beyond that: preemptive 
attack or containment? Containment may be the answer, especially given the exhaustion of U.S. 
ground forces and budgets in Iraq. But Syria better watch out. Of course, it has been said, if Syria 
were in East Asia, it would be called North Korea. But Syria is not that bad in many ways, and it is 
under tremendous pressure right now, both internally and externally. The question remains. Do 
countries join globalization or not? Do they make those connections or not? Proliferation is a way 
to opt out, not to join.  
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